The Genetic Cost of Neanderthal Introgression

The Genetic Cost of Neanderthal Introgression

Kelley Harris, Rasmus Nielsen

Genome-wide association studies suggest limited immune gene enrichment in schizophrenia compared to six immune diseases

Genome-wide association studies suggest limited immune gene enrichment in schizophrenia compared to six immune diseases

Jennie G Pouget, Vanessa F Goncalves, Schizophrenia Working Group of the PGC, Sarah L Spain, Hilary K Finucane, Soumya Raychaudhuri, James L Kennedy, Jo Knight

Defining individual size in the model filamentous fungus Neurospora crassa

Defining individual size in the model filamentous fungus Neurospora crassa
Linda Ma, Boya Song, Thomas Curran, Nhu Phong, Emilie Dressaire, Marcus Roper

Fungal mycelia potentially violate each of the tenets that define individuality in paradigmatic organisms: the mycelium of a filamentous fungi can contain millions of genetically diverse nuclei, each capable of founding new mycelia. Moreover a single mycelium can potentially stretch over kilometers and it unlikely that distant parts of these ultra-large mycelia share resources or have the same fitness. Here we directly measure how a single mycelium of the model ascomycete Neurospora crassa is patterned into reproductive individuals, by analyzing the genetic diversity of thousands of asexual spores to determine the size of the nuclear sub-population that produces each spore. In a mycelium with a single growth direction the entire width of the mycelium forms a single population. By contrast, mycelia with expanding frontiers fragment into approximately 1000 reproducing subpopulation per square cm. Nuclear subpopulations fragment further when the mycelial network is perturbed by either chemical or desiccation stress. Our results provide a concept of fungal individuality that is directly connected to reproductive potential, and therefore to theories of how fungal individuals adapt and evolve over time. Our data show that the size of fungal individuals is a dynamic and environment-dependent property, even within apparently totally connected fungal mycelia.

Multiple sequence alignment for short sequences

Multiple sequence alignment for short sequences
Kristóf Takács

Multiple sequence alignment (MSA) has been one of the most important problems in bioinformatics for more decades and it is still heavily examined by many mathematicians and biologists. However, mostly because of the practical motivation of this problem, the research on this topic is focused on aligning long sequences. It is understandable, since the sequences that need to be aligned (usually DNA or protein sequences) are generally quite long (e. g., at least 30-40 characters). Nevertheless, it is a challenging question that exactly where MSA starts to become a real hard problem (since it is known that MSA is NP-complete [2]), and the key to answer this question is to examine short sequences. If the optimal alignment for short sequences could be determined in polynomial time, then these results may help to develop faster or more accurate heuristic algorithms for aligning long sequences. In this work, it is shown that for length-1 sequences using arbitrary metric, as well as for length-2 sequences using unit metric, the optimum of the MSA problem can be achieved by the trivial alignment.

Autocratic strategies for iterated games with arbitrary action spaces

Autocratic strategies for iterated games with arbitrary action spaces
Alex McAvoy, Christoph Hauert

The recent discovery of zero-determinant strategies for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma sparked a surge of interest in the surprising fact that a player can exert control over iterated interactions regardless of the opponent’s response. These remarkable strategies, however, are known to exist only in games in which players choose between two alternative actions such as “cooperate” and “defect.” Here we introduce a broader class of autocratic strategies by extending zero-determinant strategies to iterated games with more general action spaces. We use the continuous Donation Game as an example, which represents an instance of the Prisoner’s Dilemma that intuitively extends to a continuous range of cooperation levels. Surprisingly, despite the fact that the opponent has infinitely many donation levels from which to choose, a player can devise an autocratic strategy to enforce a linear relationship between his or her payoff and that of the opponent even when restricting his or her actions to merely two discrete levels of cooperation throughout the course of the interaction. In particular, a player can use such a strategy to extort an unfair share of the payoffs from the opponent. Therefore, although the action space for the continuous Donation Game dwarfs that of the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma, players can still devise relatively simple autocratic and, in particular, extortionate strategies.