Role of epistasis on the fixation probability of a nonmutator in an adapted asexual population

Role of epistasis on the fixation probability of a nonmutator in an adapted asexual population
Ananthu James

The mutation rate of a well adapted population is prone to reduction so as to have lower mutational load. The aim here is to understand the role of epistatic interactions in this process. Using a multitype branching process, the probability of fixation of a rare nonmutator in an asexual mutator population undergoing deleterious mutations at constant, but much higher rate than that of the nonmutator is analytically calculated here. We find that antagonistic epistasis lowers chances of mutation rate reduction, while synergistic epistasis enhances it. Below a critical value of epistasis, it can be seen that the fixation probability behaves nonmonotonically with variation in mutation rate of the background population for constant selection. Also, the variation of this critical value of epistasis parameter with the strength of the mutator is discussed. For synergistic epistasis, fixation probability shows a nonmonotonic trend with respect to selection when mutation rate is held constant.

On the stochastic evolution of finite populations

On the stochastic evolution of finite populations
Fabio A. C. C. Chalub, Max O. Souza

This work is concerned with Markov chain models used in population genetics. Namely, we start from two celebrated models, the Moran and the Wright-Fisher processes, and study them from a very general viewpoint. Our aim is three fold: to identify the algebraic structures associated to time-homogeneous processes; to study the monotonicity properties of the fixation probability, with respect to the initial condition— in particular we show that there are situations, that are by no means exceptional, where an increase in the initial presence of a type can lead to a decrease in the fixation probability of this type; to understand time-inhomogeneous processes in a more systematic way. In addition, we also discuss the traditional identification of frequency dependent fitnesses and pay-offs, extensively used in evolutionary game theory, the role of weak selection when the population is finite, and the relations between jumps in evolutionary processes and frequency dependent fitnesses.

Hybrid asexuality as a primary reproductive barrier: on the interconection between asexuality and speciation

Hybrid asexuality as a primary reproductive barrier: on the interconection between asexuality and speciation

Karel Janko, Jan Pačes, Hilde Wilkinson-Herbots, Rui J Costa, Jan Röslein, Pavel Drozd, Nataliia Iakovenko, Jakub Rídl, Jan Kočí, Radka Reichová, Vēra Šlechtová, Lukáš Choleva

Admixture into and within sub-Saharan Africa

Admixture into and within sub-Saharan Africa

George Busby, Gavin Band, Quang Si Le, Muminatou Jallow, Edith Bougama, Valentina Mangano, Lucas Amenga-Etego, Anthony Emil, Tobias Apinjoh, Carolyne Ndila, Alphaxard Manjurano, Vysaul Nyirongo, Ogobara Doumbo, Kirk Rockett, Domnic Kwiatkowski, Chris Spencer, The Malaria Genomic Epidemiology Network

Serial passaging causes extensive positive selection in seasonal influenza A hemagglutinin

Serial passaging causes extensive positive selection in seasonal influenza A hemagglutinin

Claire McWhite, Austin Meyer, Claus O Wilke

Punctuated evolution and transitional hybrid network in an ancestral cell cycle of fungi

Punctuated evolution and transitional hybrid network in an ancestral cell cycle of fungi

Edgar M. Medina, Jonathan J. Turner, Jan M. Skotheim, Nicolas E. Buchler

Abundance of strategies in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma in well-mixed populations

Abundance of strategies in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma in well-mixed populations
Seung Ki Baek, Hyeong-Chai Jeong, Christian Hilbe, Martin A. Nowak

Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions. When individuals meet repeatedly, they can use conditional strategies to enforce cooperative outcomes that would not be feasible in one-shot social dilemmas. Direct reciprocity requires that individuals keep track of their past interactions and find the right response. However, there are natural bounds on strategic complexity: Humans find it difficult to remember past interactions accurately, especially over long timespans. Given these limitations, it is natural to ask how complex strategies need to be for cooperation to evolve. Here, we study stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations to systematically compare the evolutionary performance of reactive strategies, which only respond to the co-player’s previous move, and memory-one strategies, which take into account the own and the co-player’s previous move. In both cases, we compare deterministic strategy and stochastic strategy spaces. For reactive strategies and small costs, we find that stochasticity benefits cooperation, because it allows for generous-tit-for-tat. For memory one strategies and small costs, we find that stochasticity does not increase the propensity for cooperation, because the deterministic rule of win-stay, lose-shift works best. For memory one strategies and large costs, however, stochasticity can augment cooperation.